PREFACE
Dale N. Hatfield*

I appreciate the opportunity to provide introductory remarks to this issue of CommLaw Conspectus. As unusual as it is to have a technologist do so,
I believe it has become increasingly important for
legal and engineering practitioners to become
better acquainted with each other's fields of endeavor. This has never been so urgent as today,
when we are confronted with a number of vexing
issues related to the internet and the transition to
the Digital Age, to which a number of articles in
this issue of CommLaw Conspectus are devoted. Let
me explain why.
In order to appreciate where we are going, we
need to understand where we are today. As regards the internet, that means we must understand what makes the internet different from
other networks. Stated differently, what accounts
for the fabulous growth of the internet? If we
don't fully understand what is producing the internet's success, how can we be sure that some
public or private action-or lack of action-won't
destroy whatever is producing its overwhelming
success?
It is sometimes stated that the success of the internet lies in its reliance on packet switching. It is
true that packet switching has a number of advantages over the traditional circuit switching of the
public switched telephone network (PSTN). For
example, in a packet network, users don't consume network transmission capacity when they
are not generating information, which can be particularly beneficial when the information being
transmitted is "bursty," as is often the case with
data traffic. In addition, packet switching provides
a degree of "bandwidth on demand" because,
when more or less information needs to be transmitted, it is simply a matter of generating packets
at a faster or a slower rate. Finally, different types
of signals-voice, data, image, and even video-

can be multiplexed together easily in a packet
network, thus sharing transmission capacity and
enabling multimedia applications to be developed.
Yet-if you will permit me to use a common
legal expression-the packet switching response
is "necessary but not sufficient." Packet switching
has been around much longer than the recent ascent of the internet. I would argue that the success of the internet has more to do with the network architecture, and what that architecture
reveals about the policy and philosophical choices
that have been used to create the internet. What
makes the internet different lies in the inter-related notions of (1) openness, (2) modularity and
protocol layering and (3) the shifting of intelligence and control to the edge of the network. It is
packet switching with a difference.
The internet employs an open architecture. Its
standards and specifications are open, not closed
or proprietary, and are freely available without
any restrictions on use. The meetings at which the
standards are set are also open. This emphasis on
openness facilitates not only access by end users
but also the interconnection of the private and
public networks of which the internet is comprised. Further, the internet has been driven by
people who believed that general consensus on a
method or technique, and then developing the
running code or functioning software, was the
best sequence for moving forward. This contrasts
with the sequence employed by more traditional
government and telephone company standards
bodies that first developed open paper standards
and then tried to implement them in software,
often paying a price in terms of complexity and
delay. Finally, this sequence and the open architecture of the internet mean that the internet is
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more open to change and the development of
new services and applications.
To understand modularity and protocol layering, it's best to begin by envisioning an hour glass,
and to conceptualize the internet protocol at the
waist of this hour glass. The network broadens
above the waist to support a wide range of application and service layers such as e-mail and the
World Wide Web, and broadens below the waist
to enable those applications to ride on a wide
range of underlying networks using a variety of
technologies. This modularity and protocol layering promotes fair and open competition among
multiple providers of the different layers. The resulting stratification-coupled with the openness
described a moment ago-facilitates the introduction of new technologies and allows new applications to be devised and deployed, thereby stimulating innovation.
Innovation is also fostered by shifting intelligence and control to the edge of the network.
Contrasted with the more centralized and tightly
directed processes traditionally used in the PSTN,
the routers in the internet perform what is basically a dumb function of forwarding data packets
according to routing tables that are created on a
largely decentralized, dynamic basis. In the internet architecture, control is shifted to increasingly powerful computers residing at the edge of
the network. These computers are under the control of end users and service and content providers. This means that new services can be created
without the cooperation or even knowledge of the
underlying network provider.
Armed with an appreciation of what makes the
internet different, we can better appreciate what
may potentially threaten the continued success of
the internet. These threats, as you may imagine,
involve some of the very factors I have just described.
The first threat relates to layering and modularity. One of the fundamental strengths of the internet architecture is the separation of the application and service layers from the underlying
network infrastructure, using the internet Protocol as the "glue" that holds them together. But

separation does not necessarily imply that a provider shouldn't be able to compete at all layers.
For example, there may be economies of scope in
having a single firm provide multiple layers. Permitting providers to operate at multiple layers
may produce additional incentives to construct facilities and to innovate more quickly.
The potential threat, however, comes when a
provider has monopoly power in the provision of
one layer-typically, but not always, the physical
layer-and uses that monopoly power to discriminate in favor of its own services or content offered
at the upper layers of the protocol stack. The discrimination can be in terms of the price charged
for accessing the physical facility and/or the quality of the services offered by the lower layer to the
higher layer. This threat is of particular concern
in the subscriber access part of the network,
where entrenched providers and some residual
economies of scale may make competition at the
physical layer problematic. Several contemporary
policy and legal debates involve at their core these
very concerns.
The second threat relates to interconnection.
This threat stems from a number of different
things. First, internet Service Providers (ISPs) are
attempting to differentiate their networks
through the provision of advanced features and
functionality, such as quality of service (QoS)
guarantees and Service Level Agreements.
Clearly, such differentiation is a valued outcome
of competition. Yet it tends to complicate both
the technical and financial aspects of the interconnection or peering' arrangements among
ISPs. Outright refusals to interconnect or failure
to develop proper financial agreements to allow
interconnection can lead to fragmentation of the
network. Such fragmentation need not lead to a
total loss of connectivity. However, available alternatives to peering, such as using transiting agreements, 2 may lead to inefficiencies and poorer performance-for example, in terms of latency or
lost packets. Evidence of this fragmentation is indicated by the newspaper ads of large, backbone
ISPs indicating the superior performance they

I Internet backbone providers interconnect for the purpose of exchanging each other's traffic. One form of interconnection agreement, known as peering arrangements, provide for the exchange of internet traffic for free, that is,
without the payment of settlement charges. Typically, peering arrangements are used when the amount of traffic flow-

ing in each direction is roughly equivalent.
2
Transit arrangements are another form of interconnection agreement, involving payments from one provider to the
other. They are typically used when the amount of traffic is
unbalanced.
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can provide if traffic stays on their network from
end to end.
The third threat relates to a host of developments that are associated with trying to improve
the performance of the internet. These improvements include steps to improve the security, manageability, and scalability of the internet and to offer better reliability and more predictable
performance in terms of packet loss and latency
or delay. The concern here does not stem from
the objectives behind these improvements. They
are laudable. Instead, the concern stems from the
fact that the remedies may result in a return to a
more centralized form of control.
For example, techniques for providing greater
manageability and improved QoS may involve deciding on a particular route to follow and reserving end-to-end capacity on the network at the beginning of the session or call. This represents a
more connection-oriented, arguably more centralized approach to networking. It is a departure
from the decentralized, connectionless, best-effort
network approach used in the internet in the
past. This may not necessarily be bad, but carried
out improperly or carried to an extreme, it could
shift intelligence and control back to the center
of the network in such a way that it undermines
one of the major advantages of the traditional internet architecture. That advantage, as discussed
earlier, is the ability for entrepreneurs to quickly
create new services using the intelligence and
control residing at the edge of the network, and
to do so without the cooperation or even the
knowledge of the underlying network provider.
The latter point leads me to a broader
thought-the relationship between the internet

and the public switched telephone network. The
sheer magnitude of the investment in the traditional PSTN means that it will be around for many
years. This creates the obvious need for backward
compatibility between the internet and the PSTN.
The internet and the PSTN will have to come together in some way, if for no other reason than to
create efficient forms of interconnection and interworking. This process of coming together is
just beginning, and a key question is how to meld
together these two different worlds-the more decentralized, open world of the internet and the
more centralized, closed world of the PSTN. How
do we do so while maintaining the strengths of
each?
Let me conclude by stating that while I have
identified some potential threats to the continued
success of the internet, I do not necessarily want
to leave the impression that government action is
needed to try to prevent or forestall them. Clearly,
government action should be the last resort. In
fact, I raise these potential threats in the fervent
hope that the open, voluntary governance of the
internet coupled with competitive, marketplace
forces will be more than sufficient to protect it
against them.
One need only look at the range of issues covered in this issue of CommLaw Conspectus to know
that it makes an important contribution to the dialogue about how best to ensure the internet's
continued success. Thank you for the privilege of
letting me be a part of this dialogue. I hope that,
by adding some important technical considerations, I have enriched the discussion of this critical issue.

